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SiiTninary
This paper investigates the impact of the introduction of an overdraft
facility on bank's profitability. The deposit behavior of a bank customer
is modeled and the customer's "maximizing behavior" is derived. Given this
customer response the bank's change in revenues due to the overdraft facility
are expressed. Using example parameter values it is shown that the introduc-
tion of an overdraft facility will reduce bank profits. This result can be
overcome if a large increase in deposits is generated by the new facility —
an outcome deemed unlikely in a competitive environment.

OVERDRAPT CHECKING AND BANK PROFITABILITY
In recent years a growing number of commercial banks have offered an
"overdraft" adjimct to their checking accounts. This new service has
been introduced to attract new depositors, retain existing accounts, or
both. The overdraft facility may affect customer behavior in a number
of ways. For example, customers with an overdraft capability may reduce
their holdings of bank deposits, both checking and time deposits, since
they can conveniently borrow to meet expenditure needs. Or, customers
may change the mix of their deposit holdings, presumably from non-interest
earning demand deposits to interest earning time and savings deposits.
These changes in cvistomer behavior will affect the profitability of
commercial banks. The focus of this study is the impact that an over-
1draft facility has on bank profits.
The introduction of bank overdraft facilities is not the only
financial innovation affecting customer decisions about deposit balances
to hold. Bank credit cards have also affected these deposit balance
decisions. There are a number of studies that have explored the effect
of bank credit cards on the transactions demand for money.'' These studies
conclude that bank credit cards cause people to hold smaller transactions
balances. We reach the same conclusion for the Impact of overdraft
facilities on transactions balances. However, the focus here is on the
impact of this behavior on bank profits.
In summary, we find that if bank customers behave rationally, bank
profts are reduced by the introduction of an overdraft facility, if no
new elastomers are attracted. However, if a significant deposit increase
occurs as a result of the facility, bank profits may increase. In the
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next section customer reaction to an overdraft facility is examined, and
"rational behavior" is specified. In the following sections we Investigate
the impact on bank profit that results from the introduction of the over-
draft facility under conditions of (1) no new business and (2) an increase
in customers.
Customer Reaction to an Overdraft Facility
To lay the basis for the analysis, we first depict an assumed
(admittedly simplistic) behavior of a hypothetical customer. Suppose
our customer receives -and deposits his paycheck on the first day of each'
month, and writes checks continually during the month until his balance
3has reached zero. This behavior is depicted in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
Deposit Behavior of a Hypothetical Customer
Deposits
SD
1-S s
1 Month
The average balance for this customer will be
Time
(1) ^'l
-3-
where
D = average deposit, and
D = deposic at the beginning of the month.
To the extent that a customer elects to hold a "safety margin" of
demand deposits to avoid a negative balance or to reduce service charges,
there is a dollar-for-dollar increase in average deposit holdings (1 - R_)
percent of which can fund bank loans.
Suppose the bank introduces an overdraft system and that our hypo-
thetical customer is a rational maximizer. To limit the problem, consider
only those aspects of behavior contained within the bank-customer rela-
tionship. In a larger context the entire asset portfolio should be con-
sidered. We assume here that the customer has already optimized his
portfolio in a non-overdraft environment, holding other financial and
real assets besides demand deposit balances. Now the environment is
changed by the introduction of an overdraft system. With this change
we examine the ciistomer's maximizing behavior with respect to altera-
tions in the demand deposit portion or "transaction" balances of the
portfolio. Assume that the customer considers the three-pronged deci-
sion of (1) how much of his transactions balances he should retain in
demand deposits (shown as line segment D - SD in Figure 1) , (2) how much
4
he should place in savings deposits (SD in Figure 1) , and (3) to what
extent he should use his overdraft facillr/ (depicted by the shaded
triangle in Figure 1). In developing this decision, the following ad-
ditional symbols will be employed:
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R = net return to the customer,
c
3 = portion of beginning deposit placed in savings account;
alternatively, the portion of the month during which
the customer has been in debt to the bank.
r = rate paid by bank on savings account.
r. = rate charged by bank on overdraft borrowings.
The gross return to the customer on the portion of his deposit that
he allocates to sa-'/ings is sDr . To obtain the customer's net return, we
subtract from this the costs associated with borrowing against his over-
draft line. The ingredients of the cost of borrowing consist of (1) the
sD
average amount borrowed, -r—
, (2) the length of time during which the
customer was in debt, s, and (3) the rate charged on overdraft borrowing,
r, . The net return to the customer is givTen by
(2) R = 3Dr„ - ^stJ
where the first term is the gross return on the customer's savings deposit
and the second tern is the interest paid on the a^/erage borrowing under
the overdraft facility. If the customer sets s, the proportion of his
deposit to be held in the savings account, to maximize his return, it can
be shown (see Appendix) that s must be equal to:
(3) s = -i- .
^b
As might be expected, the optimal portion of funds placed in savings
accounts is positively affected by the rate paid on savings accounts,
and negatively affected by the rate charged on overdraft borrowing. In
developing the impact of an overdraft facility on bank profits we will
assxune that customers behave in a "maximizing" fashion, i.e., they set
3 according to equation (3) . This will be referred to as "Ttiaximizing'
behavior."
Bank Returns from Cverdraft Checking - No New Business
Now that we have established how customers will react to the intro-
duction of an overdraft checking facility, let us turn to the impact
on bank profits. Before the introduction of overdrafts the bank's return
IS simply
(4) R3=D(1-R^)r^
where
R^ = returns to the bank,
R_ = reserve requireraents on demand deposits, and
r^ = gross return on loans.
This expression presents the loan revenue earned by the bank on the
funds available for lending from checking accounts.
The introduction of the overdraft facility brings about se-i/eral
changes that will affect revenues and costs. Savings balances are in-
creased during the entire period. Demand balances are reduced from the
outset, reaching zero (1 - s) of the way through the period, after which
the customer writes checks against his overdraft line (see Figure 1).
Revenues are altered as lendable funds (after reserve requirements are
z&t) from demand and time deposits have changed. Also overdraft loans
provide a return (r, ) that we assume is greater than the return on other
loans (r^ ) . Increased costs to the bank stem from two sources: One,
there are increased interest payments to depositors resulting from the
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shift from demand to time deposits. Two, there are costs to the bank
as the size of the custotier's overdraft borrowing moves beyond the size
of loans which can be supported by the overdraft-related investment to
his savings accovmt
—
given our assumption about depositor behavior. As
the customer's overdraft moves beyond sD(l - IL,)
,
where IL, represents
reserve requirements on time deposits, that borrowing must be funded by
a reduction in other loans, or by bank borrowing. Note that we continue
to assume that the customer does not remove his funds from the bank.
The streams of returns and costs associated with the overdraft
facility are given by
(5) R^ =, [(1 - s)"D(l - R^)r^] + [2sD(l - R^)r^] + [s^DCr^ - r^) ] - [ZsOr^]
The first term represents the return to the bank from lending out of the
(now reduced) customer's average demand deposit balance. The second term
is loan revenioe earned on the customer's savings deposit. The third term
is the return from the customer's overdraft borrowing minus the foregone
return by not making other loans. The fourth term is the interest cost
on the customer's savings account.
Given that the bank will initiate an overdraft program, it has an
incentive to identify the rate to be charged on overdraft loans which will
achieve the best attainable profit position. Without the overdraft pro-
gram, returns to the bank on existing customers are given by (4). Returns
with the program are shown by (5), The change in returns is the difference
between (4) and (5). This is given by
(6) AR3 - 23D"(S^ - R^)r^ - ZsDr^ + s^DCr^ - R^r^)
.
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In words, the bank benefits from the program to the extent that there are
lower reserve requirements on time deposits and from proceeds from over-
draft borrowing. The chief decrease in returns results from the added
interest payments on savings deposits.
Considering only that value of s wherein consximers maximize (i.e.,
r
s = —) , the change in returns is
(7) AR3=Il[2(R^-Vr,-r^-^VJ°
a
It is easily seen that AR^ will be negative for any reasonable values
of the variables since 2(R^ - K,-)r. will be less than r . Thus, the
bank cannot hope to make a profit from its old customers by the overdraft
3
system. It shoiiLd be noted that this result wil'l hold no natter the
level of r, chosen by the bank. The higher is r, , the lower will be
the reduced profits. However, the bank cannot set its rate on overdraft
loans above a competitive level. The rate the bank charges will have a
bearing on its ability to attract new customers or to retain its present
customers,
A numerical example may be helpful in clarifying the bank's situation.
Assume the values shewn in Table 1 for the interest rates and reserve re-
quirements. Without an overdraft program, the return to the bank with an
average deposit level (d) of $1 million is $87,000 (from equation 4).
With no increase in deposits after the introduction of an overdraft ser-
vice, assuming maximizing behavior by customers, bank return is now
$76,553 (from equation 5). The reduction in return is $10,447 or 1.0447%
of the average deposit level (from equation 7).
TABLE 1
Example Values for Reserve Requirements and Interest Rates
r = interest paid on savings accoimts = 5%
r. = interest earned on loans = 10%
r, = interest earned on overdraft loans = 18%
D
R^^ = reserve requireiaent on demand deposits = 13%
B_ = reserve requirement on savings deposits = 5%
Even though the bank experiences a decline in earnings from existing
depositors by initiating an overdraft facility, this loss can be more than
offset if enough new deposits are attracted. We now turn to that area of
consideration.
New Business and Overdraft Checking
What volume of new business is required to maintain bank profitability
in the face of an overdraft checking facility? The answer depends upon
the configuration of relevant interest rates and reserve requirements.
Let D represent the "old" level of average deposits, and D„ the
increase in average deposits from offering the overdraft facility. The
new deposits will increase the returns to the bank by equation (4) , or
d" (1 - K.)t.. However, if we assume that these new deposits also follow
marcimizing behavior, s percent of them will be converted to savings
deposits, resulting in a reduced profit to the bank. Equation (7) can
be expressed in terms of the change in returns per dollar of average
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demand deposits, giving
Do ( b
Thus the total change in bank returns from the conversion to an
overdraft facility and the inflow of D„ deposits is
N
(9) AR^ = dX + Dn^1 - V^L^°N^B
where
N
AR^ " change in bank returns from conversion to overdraft
facility plus inflow of D>, deposits.
In equation (9) the first term represents the change in profit (AR is
o
negative) due to the conversion to overdraft usage by the old customers
(D ). The second term is the change in profit due to the inflow of new
o
deposits (J>.,)', the third term represents the profit change (AR„ is
negative) due to the conversion of these new deposits to overdraft usage.
The bank should maximize its profit by varying the overdraft borrow-
ing rate, but this would require knowledge of the elasticity of both D
and D with respect to r, . It is difficult to imagine a bank having
such knowledge. Rather than pursue this, it seems more appropriate to
consider the conditions under which the bank can make any profit from
this system. From equation (9) positive changes in profit exist when
D„ - AR^
(10) ^ >
o
In other words, when the percentage increase in deposits (D,,/D ) is
VI o
greater than the right hand side of equation (10), positive profit changes
will result.
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Let. us return Co the example begun in the previous section with
interest rate and reventje requirement values in Table 1. Using these
values, the right hand side of equation (10) is .136; that is, if average
deposit levels increase by 13.6% as the result of the introduction of an
overdraft system, bank profits would remain unchanged. This estimate
does not include the recovery of marketing costs or other direct costs
associated with the system.
To continue the numerical e:<anple, let us examine the balance sheet
changes that would result from the introduction of the overdraft facility.
For a bank with average deposits of $1 million, and assuming no new
accounts, the following would occur: (1) average demand deposits would
decline by $479,000; (2) savings accounts would rise by $556,000; and
(3) overdraft borrowing would average $77,000 for the month.
To offset the revenue loss associated with these developments it
would be necessary to attract new deposits to increase the average level
of deposits by $136,000, or 13.6% of the initial average level. Assuming
that new customers engage in maximizing behavior, some of these new
demand deposits would be shifted to savings deposits. After all the
shifting to achieve maximizing behavior is completed average demand
deposits will be $71,000 higher and savings deposits woiiLd be $76,00
higher. Associated with these new deposits would be a rise in average
overdraft borrowing of $11,000.
The beginning (before overdraft) , intermediate (with overdraft but
without new deposits) and final (with new deposits) balance sheets and
profit figures are shown in Figure 2. As a result of the overdraft
facility and the new deposits the bank has grown to $1,224,000 in total
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FIGURE 2
Three Balance Sheet Positions and Related Profits
(Using assumed values from Table 1)
Before
Reserves 130,000 Average DD 1,000,000
Overdraft loans - SD
Other loans 870,000
TOTALS 1,000,000
Profit = $87,000
1,000,000
With overdraft - no new deposits
Reserves 96,000
Average over-
draft loans 77,000
Other loans 904,000
Average DD
SD
521,000
556,000
TOTALS 1,077,000
Profit - $76,553
1,077,000
With overdraft - and new deposits
Reserves 109,000
AA/erage over-
draft loans 88,000
Other loans 1,027,000
Average DD
SD
592,000
632,000
TOTALS 1,224,000
Profit = $86,940
1,224,000
assets. The increased cost of the savings deposits is offset by increased
revenue from higher loans and the new overdraft loans. Part of the in-
crease in loans was funded by the redirection in required reserves.
In the analysis developed above, overdraft checking is profitable
to the customer chiefly because borrowing costs are based on daily-average
9
"negati'^" balances. In contrast, the funds placed in savings accoimts
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eam interest throughout the month. As a result average borrowings for
the month are much smaller than the funds placed in savings. Thus, even
though the interest rate charged for overdraft borrowing may be substan-
tially higher than the rate on savings, the depositor's returns on savings
exceed his cost of borrowing.
Program Modifications
If competitive conditions preclude the possiblility of a substantial
(e.g., 13.6%) increase in deposits modifications to the previously pre-
sented overdraft program may be utilized to reduce the reduction in profit
from present customer's accounts. Two possible modifications come readily
to mind: (1) charging interest on overdrafts not for the period actually
borrowed, but rather for the whole payment period, and (2) allowing over-
draft borrowing only in the form of lump sums. Both of these modifications
effectively increase the cost of borrowing to the customer and hence will
decrease the optimal s, or the portion of the month that borrowing takes
place. While these modifications will reduce the bank's profit reduction
from old customers, they will also diminish the attractiveness of the
overall program to new customers. Whether the less attractive modified
program will be able to attract sufficient new customers to keep profits
imchanged is doubtful.
The implications of the first modification are easily seen. If
interest on the overdraft is now charged for the whole period, the return
to the customer is now (instead of equation 2) simply
(2a) Re = sD(r^ - r, )3
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A customer now maxindzes (2a) by simply setting s equal to zero, given
that negative values of s are impossible. That is, the customer will
not use his overdraft facility at all for transactions needs , saving its
use solely to meet uncertainty. The bank's loss from old customers will
be reduced to zero, but the overdraft facility will also be much less
attractive to new customers.
The second possibility for offsetting losses from old customers is
to lend on overdraft only in lumps. When an account goes negative, the
customer is loaned, say, $100, as the account goes just below minus $100
an additional $100 is loaned, and so on.
If y. is the size of the lump in dollars, while borrowing the customer
will on the average be borrowing
-j more dollars than without the lump.
Since the cxistomer will be borrowing for a time equal to s percent of
sx
the period, his average extra borrowing caused by the lianp will be y^
r, 3x
and the extra cost will therefore be —r— ,
With the lump, the return to the customer is
(11) Re - sDr -
r^s^ r^sx
where the third term represents the cost of the increased borrowing
caused by the lump. The optimal s for the customer is now (see Appendix
for derivation)
:
(12) 3 = -2. - ^
-b 4D
The customer will put less into his savings account and borrow later In
the month on overdraft than without the lumps.
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The returns to the bank in terms of s will be as before except for
two added terms. Because the customer will have increased demand deposits
(equal to the amount of the expanded overdraft borrowing caused by the
lump) the bank must fund the reserves required against those deposits.
The cost to the bank of those borrowings is 2~Rr,r, . Also, the bank will
sxhave additional income, y^^, from the expanded overdraft loan to the
customer (related to the lump). The sum of these two terms is
-^(r, - ILr^
)
2 b u L
Taking this term into account converts the change in returns from that
given in equation (6) to
(13) AR^ = 2sD(R^ -
^)^L - ^^^^s + ^^^° +P ^^b " ^^L^
'
r
At the optimal s of -^ with the lump equation (7) now becomes
^b 4D
(14) ,R^=^[2(R^- Vrx,-r3-Vr,]D
•f^[r - (.
-Or, -^^^b- Vl>^
-
s T) X L
2D
Maximizing AS^ with respect to the lump yields an optimal ratio for
X of
(15)
I) T L
D - V
At this value for x (or —) or any scalier x, AIL, from equation (14) is
D
^
greater than AR_ from equation (7). Tnat is, the lump decreases the
loss to the bank from old customers. In fact at the optimal — it is
D
possible that by setting the size of the lump optimally the bank can
prevent any loss at all from its old customer's behavior. However, the
optimal size of the lump is going to be unrealistically large. For our
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h3rpothetical values of the parameters optimal ^ is -^yzy or about one
hundred percent. This is clearly sxibstantially above any practical limit,
and rxJ.es out the possibility of preventing adl losses from the old
customers. Substantially smaller and more realistic values of x will
not prevent at least some losses from old customers. Thus it can be
seen that modifications to the overdraft program designed to reduce
losses from old customers will also diminish the attractiveness of the
program and reduce the chances of attracting sufficient new customers to
increase overall profits.
Automatic Transfer Accoimts
The framework developed here can be applied equally well to an
analysis of the recently approved automatic transfer accounts (AT's)
for commercial accounts. Under an AT arrangement the bank customer can
have funds automatically transferred from a savings account to a checking
accovmt to maintain an agreed-upon balance in the checking account. The
funds transferred from the savings account are equivalent to overdraft
borrowing and the cost of "borrowing" (r, ) is simply the foregone
interest on the savings account (i.e., r, » r ) . With no restrictions
the optimal s for the customer is 1 (from equation 3) , or maintenance of
a zero balance checking accovmt and all funds in the savings account.
The impact on bank profits is severe, reducing Rg from 7.66% per dollar
of deposits (for s = .278) to 4.0% (for s = 1) for the reserve requirements
and interest rates assutoed in Table 1. To reduce this profit shrinkage
banks have resorted to minimum balance requirements, mininum (lump)
transfers, and transfer charges. These devices all reduce s below 1,
or generate other revenues to offset the profit shrinkage. However,
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evaluating equation (15) using r = r, shows chat the minitaum lump
sum transfer to avoid reducing profits is 4.5 tines the average deposit
level, clearly unworkable. Conclusions about the profit impact of an
overdraft facility also apply to the profit impact of an AT system for
a bank.
Conclusions
The overall effect on a bank from adding an overdraft program is
quite likely to be lower bank profits 'unless very substantial new custonfir
business is generated by the program. Bank costs generated by old customer
behavior switching out of demand deposits into time deposits outweigh
revenues from overdraft loans. That is, for every dollar so switched by
old customers the bank will gain only (R^ - R™)r^ and lose r . This net
loss cannot be offset in the case of an overdraft program through the
returns from increased overdraft borrowing. The attraction of new cus-
tomers by the program must therefore be substantial enough to offset
these losses from the bank's old customers. Modifying the program to
eliminate the profit shrinkage from old custonfirs holds little promise.
Some combination of loss reduction with some gain in customers seems to
hold the best hope for maintaining profit levels, but this result would
be difficult to achieve in competitive market conditions.
The analysis here is concerned with the impact on the profits of
an individual bank from introducing an overdraft facility. While a
single bank may be able to increase its profits, primarily by increasing
its deposits, clearly the banking system as a whole will suffer a reduc-
tion in profit. Deposit shifts among banks will reduce the profit-
generating ability of the deposit-losing banks. Hence the overdraft
-17-
facility, while providing an increased return to bank custOToers , cannot
be profit-justified in its own right for the commercial banking system.
M/E/188
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FOOTNOTES
One author states that "unsecured, openend revolving credit
is one of the fastgrowing forms of consumer credit." He claims that
this type of lending "... can become the most profitable." See William
B. McNeill, "Primary Areas of Consumer Credit," in The Banker's Handbook
,
edited by William H. Baughn and Charles E. Walker, revised edition,
Dow Jones-Irwin, 1978, pp. 750-767.
2
See Hester, Donald D. , "Monetary Policy in a 'Checkless
Society'," Journal of Finance , 26 (May 1972), pp. 279-293; Lewis, Kenneth
A., "A Note on the Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for
Cash," Journal of Finance 29 (September 1974), pp. 1149-52; Sastry,
A. S. Rama, "The Effect of Credit on Transactions Demand for Cash,"
Journal of Finance 24 (September 1970), pp. 777-81; and White, Kenneth
J. , "The Effect of Bank Credit Cards on the Household Transactions
Demand for Money," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (February 1976),
pp. 51-61.
while the transactions demand literature has rejected this
simplistic behavior pattern, the emphasis of this literature has been
on business accounts. Despite this literature, the behavior depicted
here remains a useful approximation of household behavior.
4
The analysis is this study is confined to the bank-customer relation-
ships. We do not consider the effects of the movement of fxmds outside the
bank.
At this point we ignore any (non pecuniary) return to the customer
(net of service charges) on demand deposits. If this return were in-
cluded, R would of course be larger, and the optimal s, equation (3),
would be smaller.
For simplification, the "cost" of demand deposit funds to the
bank (net of service charge income) has been omitted. Had this cost
been included the values for the change in bank returns, equations (6)
and (7) , would be larger. However, the thrust of the resvilts would
not be changed.
To simplify the analysis, we ignore the option of funding from
non-deposit sources. Put differently, we assume (contrary to fact) that
gross returns on loans, r^ , is equal to the cost of, say borrowing in
the federal funds market.
Q
Recall that the return on demand deposits to customers and the
costs of demand deposits to banks have been omitted. Had these been
included, the shift from demand to savings accounts would be less, and
the bank's return would ^o^ fall as much, although it would still fall
if reasonable values are assigned to the two missing elements.
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9
Strictly speaking the balances do not go negative because the depositor
receives an automatic loan to restore a zero balance.
Such large values for the lump also make nonsense of our implicit
assumption that the customer will end the period with his last lump
completely used up by his payment needs
.
For an example of how these devices affect bank profits see Alfred
Broaddus, "Automatic Transfers from Savings to Checking: Perspective
and Prospects," Economic Review
, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
November/December 1978, pp. 3-13.
APPEiroiX
Optimal 3 for the overdraft customer
To derive the optimal s, equation (2), the return to the customer
is differentiated with respect to s, which is the customer's decision
variable, giving
(2a) 4^ - Dr - sDr, .ds 3 b
Setting (2a) to zero, thereby maximizing the customer's return gives
(3) s = -5..
^b
Optimal s with lumo transfers
The return to the customer using a lump transfer is shown in
equation (11). Again, differentiating (10) with respect to s yields
f^ . , dRc _, _ X(11a) dl" " °^s - ^^° - ^b2-
Setting (10a) equal to zero and solving for x gives
(11,) 3=^-1^.
Expressing 10b in terms of D, or average level of demand deposits gives
(12) s = -1 - ^.
^b 4D




